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We examine the interplay between limited public funds and renegotiation
when a foreign ﬁrm invests in social infrastructure. It is found that the
critical factor is how the ﬁnance constraint alters the threat point for the
government in renegotiation. Through its eﬀect on this threat point, a mild
restriction on ﬁnance results in higher domestic welfare and total surplus,
but a tighter restriction deters entry, even with the ﬁnance available being
suﬃcient to cover the investor’s total costs. Domestic welfare and the total
surplus are non-monotonic in the availability of ﬁnance, with implications,
for example, for project aid policy.
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1Foreign Investment in Infrastructure, Limited
Public Funds, and Renegotiation
1 Introduction
Social infrastructure, such as roads, sanitation and water facilities, can have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on growth and poverty alleviation (World Bank, 2004). How-
ever, government expenditure on infrastructure in developing economies is typi-
cally heavily constrained by the scarcity of public funds. Given also the recogni-
tion that private provision is generally associated with greater economic eﬃciency,
this has led to a shift, in the last twenty years or so, towards private provision
of infrastructure by foreign investors (Guasch, 2004; Estache, 2008). However,
as emphasized by Laﬀont (2005), in many developing economies the rule of law
is insuﬃcient to prevent governments from reneging on contracts, and since in-
frastructure investment typically involves a large sunk element that is long-lived
and non-transferable, investors are particularly vulnerable to hold-up. Investor-
state disputes have become increasingly common (UNCTAD, 2010), and Guasch
(2004), for example, notes that in Latin America from 1985-2000, about 12% of
concessions (excluding telecommunications) were renegotiated at the request of
the government.
The present paper develops a simple model to focus on the interplay between
the scarcity of public funds and renegotiation. We assume that the government
2a n dt h ef o r e i g ni n v e s t o rﬁrst negotiate a price, after which the investor sinks an
investment. But then renegotiation over price may take place, with the government
using the threat of expropriation in the form of nationalization. If expropriation
were to occur, the investor would have to be given some compensation and the
state would operate the project, though with high running costs.1 The use of
state funds has a signiﬁcant excess burden, but, in addition, there is an upper
bound on the funds available for the project. This bound might, for example,
depend on the anticipated beneﬁts, the competing uses for public funds and the
government’s overall ﬁnancial position. (We exclude the trivial case in which the
available ﬁnance is insuﬃcient to cover the investor’s costs.)
We determine the range within which the ﬁnance constraint provides credible
commitment for the government in its negotiation with the investor, allowing it
to get a (weakly) better deal. Within this range, less ﬁnance is welfare-enhancing
for the host country. But we also ﬁnd that there is a range in which, despite the
project potentially generating a gain for each party, the investor will not make a
proﬁt and so chooses not to enter. This situation derives from the eﬀect of the
ﬁnance constraint on the government’s threat point for renegotiation, with the
potential for hold-up destroying the incentive to invest.
The rationale for the latter result is as follows. The only eﬀe c tt h a tt h ei n i -
1The international agreements that specify compensation in practice are discussed brieﬂyi n
the text. See Hajzler (2010) for data on the nationalizations that have actually occurred.
3tially agreed price has on the solution is through the amount of compensation that
would be paid in the event of expropriation. The amount of compensation would
be higher if the price in the initial agreement were higher. However, the ﬁnance
constraint limits the amount that can be paid as compensation. This eﬀectively
limits the initial price to be no higher than the level at which, if there were expro-
priation, the government would just exhaust the available ﬁnance. Any positive
i n c r e m e n ta b o v et h i sp r i c ew o u l dn o tb ec r e d i b l es i n c e ,i fi tw e r et oc o m ei n t o
play - through its eﬀe c to nc o m p e n s a t i o n-t h ei n c r e m e n tw o u l db ed i s r e g a r d e d .
The indirect constraint that the available ﬁnance constraint thus imposes on the
initially agreed price limits the price that will eventually be agreed by renegotia-
tion. Unless the available ﬁnance exceeds the investor’s total costs by a suﬃcient
amount, the investor, foreseeing a loss, will not start the project.
To maximize domestic welfare and the total surplus from the project, the level
of ﬁnance should exceed the investor’s costs by the amount that is just suﬃcient to
induce entry. A lower level of ﬁnance than this, even one that covers the investor’s
costs, would not allow the project to go ahead; a higher level of ﬁnance would
lead to a higher price, an unnecessary cost from the host country’s point of view,
and one which would reduce the total surplus because of the excess burden of
government funds.
The literature on ‘concession’ contracts for foreign investors in infrastructure
4has grown signiﬁcantly in recent years. In particular, renegotiation is analyzed by
Guasch et al. (2006, 2007) in a framework in which the investor only discovers
its true costs after the initial contract has been agreed. In the 2006 paper rene-
gotiation may occur at the initiative of the investor because its costs have turned
out to be high and so the initial agreement would not allow it to cover costs. The
2007 paper considers renegotiation at the initiative of the government, which may
result from an election occurring after the initial contract has been agreed, the
new ruling party instigating renegotiation because it has diﬀerent preferences to
the original ruling party. These papers are not concerned with the ﬁnance avail-
able for a project, but Engel et al. (2006) develop a model of renegotiation in
which political constraints on spending play a critical role. In their analysis the
government is willing to expose itself to investor-initiated renegotiation as a means
of getting expenditures accepted that would otherwise be politically unacceptable.
Also, though not concerned with hold-up, Maskin and Tirole (2008) show a route
through which limitation of funding may have a positive eﬀect on social welfare.
They consider public-private partnerships with self-interested public oﬃcials who
want to run their own pet projects; but limited ﬁnance can restrict their discretion,
improving their decisions in social-welfare terms.
Our analysis is related to the literature on FDI in commercial projects that ex-
amines repeated bargaining games in which the potential expropriation is through
5taxation. However, these models focus on issues such as the eﬀect of high taxes
on the government’s reputation with future investors and possible retaliation by
foreign governments, not on the role of the government budget constraint (see, e.g.,
Chisik and Davies, 2004). A branch of the literature to which the present paper
is more directly relevant is that on foreign aid, particularly on the relative merits
of project aid and general programme aid. This literature deals with issues such
as the need to monitor recipients’ eﬀorts and the extent of crowding out of other
investments (see Cordella and Dell’Ariccia, 2007). But for the case in which aid
is used to pay a foreign investor, our analysis also suggests a route through which
the availability of aid for a project may have a non-monotonic eﬀect on welfare.
In Section 2 we set up a benchmark model in which there is no ﬁnance con-
straint, and in Section 3 we add in the ﬁnance constraint. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
Consider an infrastructure project that requires a ﬁxed investment to be sunk by
a foreign ﬁrm (the ‘investor’), and for which payment will be made out of public
sector funds. This is consistent with the output of the project having a large
public good element (e.g., a port or a road) or being a merit good for which a
policy decision has been taken that distribution will be free or at a nominal price
(e.g., water). At time t =1the investor and the government agree on a ‘contract
6price’ p (failure to agree would yield default payoﬀs of zero) and then, before the
next time period starts, the investor sinks an amount K (all values are in present-
value terms). At t =2 , renegotiation is triggered if the government can credibly
threaten to expropriate and have the state sector operate the project. The contract
is therefore incomplete, with the government having de facto residual control rights
over the asset. If expropriation occurs, compensation must be paid, as speciﬁed
below, and the state sector then operates the asset. Renegotiation would cause
the price P that is paid to exceed the contract price p and the project would then
operate with running cost W for the investor.2
The investor’s net proﬁt Π if it sinks the capital and operates the project is
Π = P − K − W. (1)
Payment P has a cost of (1 + θ)P to the domestic economy, where θ ≥ 0. θ
represents the excess burden of taxation, which can be substantial for developing
economies, typically being greater than unity (Laﬀont, 2005). However, we assume
in this section that there is no limit on the public funds available for the project.
T h eg o v e r n m e n ti sa s s u m e dt ow i s ht om a x i m i z et h en e te ﬀect of the project on
2The provision of the service may instead be formulated as occuring over many periods, with
repeated bargaining over price. Adding this complication aﬀects the detail of the results, but
not the general points made.
7domestic welfare, which is
N = U − (1 + θ)P, (2)
where U denotes the utility of the project output to the domestic population. We
assume that
Uθ ≥ K + W,w h e r eUθ ≡ U/(1 + θ).( 3 )
The overall surplus from the project is S = Π + N = U − K − W − θP.T h u s ,
because of the excess burden, both domestic welfare and the surplus are decreasing
in P.F o ra l lP ∈ [K + W,Uθ] the participation constraints Π ≥ 0 and N ≥ 0 are
satisﬁed and S ≥ 0.
In the event of expropriation, the state is assumed to be less eﬃcient than the
investor at operating the facility, its running cost being (1 + γ)W,w h e r eγ>0.
The project still yields utility U, but, because revenue is raised through taxation,
the domestic welfare cost of expropriation is (1+θ)[C+(1+γ)W],w h e r eC denotes
compensation to the investor.
International investment is protected by customary international law and by
numerous Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), specifying the payment of com-
pensation in the event of expropriation (see Elkins et al., 2006). For example,
for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) most agreements use the Hull
formula, according to which ‘appropriate’ compensation should be paid. The most
common interpretation of ‘appropriate’ is that compensation be related to the
8‘market value’ or ‘fair market value’ that obtains immediately before the intention
of expropriation is revealed (FTAA, 1999). In our model we reﬂect this by assum-
ing that compensation is related to, but less than, the investor’s marginal forgone
proﬁt p − W (after sinking K). Speciﬁcally, we assume that
C = δ(p − W) where δ ∈ (0,1).( 4 )
Since p depends on K, C depends indirectly on K.3 The absence in BITs of
speciﬁcation of the exchange rate for this compensation and the expectation that,
ex post, a government will drag its feet in paying may have a negative eﬀect on δ.
I nt h ee v e n to fe x p r o p r i a t i o n ,t h er e s p e c t i v ev a l u e so fΠ and N would be
Π
e = C − K;( 5 )
N
e = U − (1 + θ)[C +( 1+γ)W].
Since δ<1, (4) and (5) imply that the investor (weakly) prefers the contract to
be honoured, rather than the project to be expropriated.
Given the contract price p agreed at t =1 , expropriation is a credible threat
3If C did not depend on p,t h e np would be irrelevant at t =2 . E.g., if C = βK,w h e r e
β ∈ (0,1), an agreement on price at t =1would be superﬂuous. If the investment takes place,
then at t =2the Nash bargain would yield P = βK+(1+γ/2)W. The investor would be willing
to sink the investment if P ≥ K + W, i.e., if W ≥ 2(1 − β)K/γ.
9at t =2if Ne ≥ U − (1 + θ)p, which, using (4) and (5), reduces to
p ≥
1 − δ + γ
1 − δ
W ≡ ¯ p.( 6 )
Assuming for now that (6) is satisﬁed, the government and the investor bargain
over P at t =2 , the Nash bargain solving maxP Φ = {[U − (1 + θ)P] − Ne}.(P −
W − C). Using (4) and (5), this yields P = ˆ P(p),w h e r e
ˆ P(p)=δp+
³





Using (6), ˆ P(p) <p , i.e., the renegotiated price is lower than the contract price.
The bargain over p at t =1solves maxp Ψ =[ U − (1 + θ)P](P − K − W),w h e r e





[Uθ + K +( 2 δ − γ − 1)W].( 8 )
Substituting (8) back into (7) gives
P
∗ =( Uθ + K + W)/2.( 9 )
P = P∗ if p ≥ ¯ p. Nonetheless, when the investor and the government bargain at
t =1they have the option of setting p<¯ p, in which case there is no renegotiation
10and P = p. But since our concern will be with the eﬀe c tt h a taﬁnance constraint
may have when there is renegotiation, we ensure that renegotiation takes place by
conﬁning our analysis to the case in which K +W ≥ ¯ p; i.e., we restrict parameter
values such that if p were given a value so low that renegotiation would not occur,





W.( 1 0 )
To satisfy (10) the capital cost must be suﬃciently large relative to the running
cost, the required capital cost being larger the more ineﬃcient is public provision
and the weaker is the dependence of compensation on marginal proﬁt.
3L i m i t e d F i n a n c e
Now suppose that there is an upper limit F on the budget for the project. To
exclude the theoretically trivial case in which F is so small as to prevent the
investor from recovering costs, we assume that
K + W ≤ F.( 1 1 )
4If K + W ≤ ¯ p the negotiation at t =1will involve payoﬀs for both players that are dis-
continuous at p =¯ p. An aspect of the negotiation is then whether to set p above or below this
level.
11The constraint on ﬁnance imposes the condition that P ≤ F,a n dw ea s s u m e
that it implies that p ≤ F, i.e., the government and investor will not agree to a
contract price that each player knows in advance the government could not possibly
honour. (An aspect of this might be that, if p is publicly observable, the general
public would be uncomfortable with a deal that is unaﬀordable). Additionally, the
ﬁnance constraint may aﬀect the solution by imposing a binding an upper limit
on the government’s expenditure should expropriation occur, that is, on the sum
of compensation and running costs for the project, and this constraint binds, the
government’s threat point for renegotiation changes.
Before considering this issue, note ﬁr s tt h a tw h e nt h er e q u i r e m e n tt h a tp ≤ F
is combined with the condition for renegotiation to be credible in the benchmark
model (p ≥ ¯ p) we obtain, using (6),
F ≥
1 − δ + γ
1 − δ
W ≡ F
x.( 1 2 )
Given (10) and (11), (12) necessarily holds. Hence, based on condition (6), the
introduction of the constraint on ﬁnance does not prevent the government from
paying the amount - ¯ p or more - that will make the threat of expropriation cred-
ible. Since the imposition of the ﬁnance constraint may make the government’s
expenditure in the event of expropriation smaller (and cannot make it larger), it
may make the critical level of p at which the threat of expropriation is credible be
12lower than ¯ p (and cannot make it larger than ¯ p). It follows that F will still exceed
the critical level of p:t h eﬁn a n c ec o n s t r a i n tc a n n o tp r e v e n tp f r o mt a k i n gah i g h
enough value for expropriation to be a credible threat.
We now turn to the eﬀect of limited ﬁnance on the expenditure that the gov-
ernment, would be able to make should expropriation occur. This imposes the
constraint
C +( 1+γ)W ≤ F.( 1 3 )






[F − (1 − δ + γ)W].( 1 4 )
This indirectly constrains the value of P. When determining p at t =1 ,i ti s
known that P will depend on p as in (7) only if p ≤ pc.I fi n s t e a dp were to be set
an increment above pc, the increment would be disregarded in the bargain over P
because, in the event of expropriation, it have no eﬀect on the compensation paid.
But if p = pc,( 7 )r e d u c e st oP = F −
γ
2W.T h u s ,
P = δp+
³




W if p ≤ p
c;( 1 5 )
P = F −
γ
2
W if p = p
c.( 1 6 )
From (16), if p = pc, P<F .B u ti n( 1 5 )P is maximized at p = pc,a n ds oP<F
13in (15) as well. Thus, by imposing the constraint (13), we ensure that P<F .
The interior solution in the benchmark case again holds if p∗ ≤ pc, i.e., using




[K + Uθ +( 1+γ)W] ≡ F
c.( 1 7 )
Then P = P∗ <F. If, however, (17) does not hold, we have p = pc, in which case,
from (16), P = F −
γ






.T h u s ,




)W ≡ ¯ F (18)
the project would be loss-making for the investor: although a range of P exists for
which both N and Π are positive, the potential for hold-up once the investment
K has been sunk prevents the investor from entering.
From (17) and (18), ¯ F − Fc = −(Uθ − K − W)/2 < 0,a n d ,u s i n gt h i s ,w e
obtain the following.
Proposition 1 Assume F ≥ Fx.T h e n ( a ) i f F ≥ Fc > ¯ F then p = p∗ and
P = P∗;( b )I fFc >F≥ ¯ F then p = pc and P = F −
γ
2W,w i t hdN/dF < 0;( c )
if Fc > ¯ F>Fthe project is not undertaken.
In case (a) the ﬁn a n c ec o n s t r a i n ti sn o tt i g h te n o u g ht op l a yar o l e .I nc a s e( b )
as m a l l e rF has a positive eﬀect on domestic welfare, even though in this case the
14ﬁnance constraint does not directly limit price P.T h eﬁnance constraint provides
an element of credible commitment for the government in its negotiation with the
investor, allowing it to get a (weakly) better deal. As noted in the introduction
this parallels a result of Maskin and Tirole (2007), who consider public-private
partnerships with self-interested public oﬃcials. However, in our case (c) the
ﬁnance constraint has an adverse eﬀect, exacerbating the threat of hold-up such
that the investor will not enter. Because of the eﬀect of the ﬁnance constraint on
the government’s threat point, for the project to go ahead it is not enough for the
available ﬁn a n c et ob ee n o u g ht oc o v e rt h ec o s t so ft h ei n v e s t o r :i tm u s ta l s ob e
enough to cover half of the additional running costs that the state would incur if
it were to expropriate the project.5
Although we have been viewing F as determined by political and institutional
factors, rather than being a choice variable, it is interesting to note the value of
F at which N and S are maximized. If P = P∗ then N ≥ 0 and S ≥ 0.S i n c e
both dN/dP < 0 and dS/dP < 0, N and S are each positive for the lower price P
that obtains when the ﬁnance constraint binds. Using Proposition 1 we therefore
obtain the welfare-maximizing value of F.
Proposition 2 Assuming F ≥ Fx, the maximum feasible values of domestic wel-






W ≡ ¯ F.
5Using (12) and (18), a necessary condition for case (c) to obtain is that K>
γ(1+δ)
2(1−δ)W.T h i s
is implied by (10).
15If F prevents the benchmark solution from holding, a lower F is associated
with greater domestic welfare and greater overall surplus - but only as far as






W ≡ ¯ F.Al e v e lo fF lower than this would result in N = S =0 ,
the project not going ahead. Thus, the value of F that maximizes domestic welfare
and the surplus is greater than the investor’s total costs K + W.
4 Concluding Comments
We have considered how a constraint on funds for a project can aﬀect the renegoti-
ation associated with the hold-up problem. The critical factor in the model is how
this constraint alters the threat point for the government. A mild restriction on
ﬁnance is beneﬁcial in terms of domestic welfare and the total surplus because it
commits the government to paying less compensation in the event of expropriation.
This limits the price that can be meaningfully agreed in the initial contract, which
in turn limits the renegotiated price actually paid. The positive eﬀect on domestic
welfare and the total surplus follows because the excess burden is reduced. Al-
ternatively, if the restriction on ﬁnance is suﬃciently strong, though still leaving
the government with enough ﬁnance to more-than cover the investor’s total costs,
the investor will not start the project. This is again because of the eﬀect on the
government’s threat point for renegotiation, but in this case the threat of hold-up
is strong enough to prevent entry. From these arguments, the level of ﬁnance that
16maximizes domestic welfare and the total surplus follows: it is at the critical level
that divides the two cases. It exceeds the investor’s total costs by an amount that
is increasing in the excess running costs that the government would incur in the
event of expropriation.
These results have been obtained from a highly simpliﬁed model in which there
is considerable scope for generalization and development. One possibility would
be to bring in some of the features examined in the Guasch et al. (2006, 2007)
formulations, with the investor having superior information on costs, though with
true costs only being discovered after the investment is sunk. Another would be to
assume that, instead of the government being benevolent, decisions are made by
self-interested public oﬃcials who are willing to take bribes when negotiating the
initial contract and ﬁnal prices. These oﬃcials might coordinate their behaviour
(centralized corruption) or behave independently (decentralized corruption). The
impact of the ﬁnance constraint on the relative merits of centralized and decen-
tralized corruption might be examined.
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